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Full Disclosure: How Should Lenders Respond to the Heightened
Reporting Requirements of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act?
I. INTRODUCTION
Prompted by the release of lenders' data under the revised
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA),' New York Attorney General
Eliot Spitzer sought to force New York banks to disclose minority2
reports.
applicant credit scores not supplied in their 2004 HMDA
Spitzer requested the information to help the Attorney General's office
understand how loans are being priced and if lending decisions were
being made according to legitimate business justifications.3 Spitzer's
investigation was spurred by HMDA reports showing that minorities
were receiving significantly higher priced loans than white applicants.4
A federal judge ruled that Spitzer was barred from issuing subpoenas or
demanding inspection of the records of any national banks and from
bringing court actions against national banks to enforce New York fairlending laws. 5 This was the first of what may be many more inquiries
and legal actions against lenders in response to the 2004 data released
under the revised HMDA.6
HMDA now requires that lenders make loan-pricing information
for home mortgages available to the public. 7 Lenders can expect
community and civil rights groups and regulators to scrutinize this data
heavily, but a central question is how will banks and other lending
institutions prepare for the fallout, scrutiny, and possible litigation that

1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-10 (2005).
2. Michele Heller, Judge Stops Spitzer's Probe of National Banks, AM. BANKER
ONLINE, (Oct. 13, 2005), http://www.americanbanker.com/article_search.html?article

queryid = 1014841164&hitnum=l.
3.

Associated Press, Spitzer Probes Claims of Race Bias at Banks: N. Y AG Looking at

Practicesfor Setting Mortgage Rates, Fees, Apr. 28, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
7667799/.
4. Id.
5. Heller, supra note 2.
6. Associated Press, supra note 3.
7. Benjamin B. Klubes & Benjamin P. Saul, New Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
PricingData: The Next Enforcement and LitigationFrontfor Lenders, 21 REv. BANKING &
FIN. SERVICES 63 (2005).
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are sure to accompany the data reporting of the more stringent revised
HMDA? This question is a very salient one and requires lenders to take
proactive steps in order to minimize the risks associated with bad public
relations, litigation, and federal regulation surrounding each lender's
2004 HMDA data.8 Preliminary reports of this data have already
energized the media to report negatively regarding the lending practices
of banks 9 and will, almost certainly, lead to a flurry of regulatory
agency investigations and class action lawsuits.1° This Note examines
the potential issues that lending institutions will face in light of the
publicity of the new HMDA data and outlines proactive steps that
institutions can take in order to prepare themselves for the legal and
media fallout.11
Part II of this Note will briefly examine the history of
discriminatory lending practices and discuss HMDA. 12 Parts 1113 and
IV 14 will explore the new requirements of HMDA and the new data
produced. Part V will examine the potential for lawsuits, look at
lawsuits in which parties have used HMDA data to support their claims,
and closely examine why the claims succeeded or failed, in order to
prepare lending institutions for potential litigation. 1" Part VI will
discuss and outline proactive steps that lenders can take to prepare and
protect themselves from potential negative fallout from the new HMDA
16
data reports.
II.

THE HISTORY OF LOAN DISCRIMINATION AND

HMDA

HMDA, enacted in 1975 and implemented by Federal Reserve
Board Regulation C,' 7 is aimed at discouraging loan discrimination.18
8. Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 70.
9. Id. at 65.
10. Id. at 63.
11. See infra notes 157-195 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 17-47 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 48-70 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 71-90 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 91-56 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 157-95 and accompanying text.
17. 12 C.F.R. §§ 203 (2005); see also Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Background and
Purpose, http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/history.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2006).
18. 12 C.F.R. § 203.1(b) (2005); see also Wesley Few, Nelson Mullins Riley and
Scarborough, LLP, From Red-lining to Reverse Red-Lining, Disparate Treatment and
DisparateImpact Data- Are You Preparedfor Release of the Expanded 2004 HMDA Data
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HMDA encourages banks and other lenders to reinvest in the
communities that they serve.1 9 Prior to HMDA, there were findings that
lenders contributed to the decline of these communities by denying
qualified borrowers access to loans simply due to their inner city
locations. 20 Banks and lenders were accused of "red-lining" certain
communities, based upon the "perceived practice of drawing red lines
on maps around areas for which they would not make loans."'', The
"view was that inner city neighborhoods were declining due to lack of
available credit for sale, improvement and rehabilitation of homes. 22 In
order to encourage banks to reinvest in the areas where their depositors
lived, HMDA was designed to publicize the banks' lending practices.23

The act states, "[t]he Congress finds that some depository institutions
have sometimes contributed to the decline of certain geographic areas

by their failure pursuant to their chartering responsibilities to provide
adequate home financing to qualified applicants on reasonable terms. 24
Historically, HMDA provided no guidelines or rules designed to

enforce community reinvestment.

It only required that banks report

lending statistics on the number and total monetary amount of loans

made or purchased on home purchases, home refinances, and home
improvements within their Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). 26 Two
years after HMDA was enacted, in 1977, Congress passed the
this September? (July 8, 2005), http://www.nmrs.com/news/nelson-mullins-articlesspeeches-detail.cfln?id=39; Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Background and Purpose,
supra note 17.
19. Joseph M. Kolar, Buckley Kolar, LLP, The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act.
History, Evolution, and Limitations. slide 4 (March 14, 2005), http://www.chase.com/cm
/chf/miscellaneous/file/documentiKolar.ppt.
20. Legal Match, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, http://www.legalmatch.com/lawlibrary/article/home-mortgage-disclosure-act-.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2006).
21. Few, supra note 18.
22. Kolar, supra note 19, at slide 3.
23. Legal Match, supra note 20.
24. 12 U.S.C. § 2801(a) (2005). The Act also states that "[t]he purpose of this chapter
is to provide the citizens and public officials of the United States with sufficient information
to enable them to determine whether depository institutions are filling their obligations to
serve the housing needs of the communities and neighborhoods in which they are located
and to assist public officials in their determination of the distribution of public sector
investments in a manner designed to improve the private investment environment." Id.§
2801(b).
25. Id.at § 2804 (noting that there are no guidelines or rules specifically laid out to
enforce community reinvestment).
26. Kolar, supra note 19, at slides 5-6; see also Home Mortgage Disclosure Act:
History of HMDA, http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/history2.htm (last visited Jan. 20, 2006).
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Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), 27 to work jointly with HMDA to
more effectively encourage banks to reinvest in their communities.2 8
"The CRA require[s] banks to be responsive to the credit needs of their
entire
communities,
including
'lowand
moderate-income
neighborhoods, and to provide appropriate access to banking
services.,,29

In 1989, Congress made the first revisions to HMDA that
allowed for better monitoring of loan discrimination. ° These revisions
expanded HMDA to include mortgage lenders that were not affiliated
with depository institutions.31

It also required lenders to report

application statistics,32 information regarding loan originations, as well
as, the race, sex, and income of loan applicants and borrowers.33
Lenders were also required to identify the class of purchaser for
mortgage loans sold and were permitted to explain the basis for their
lending decisions.34
The 1989 revisions to HMDA were a significant step toward
encouraging lenders to be more accountable for their loan decisions.35
By requiring lenders to include application statistics, demographic
information about applicants and borrowers, and identification of the
class of purchasers, Congress held lenders to a higher standard of

responsibility.36 With more demographic information about applicants
and borrowers available, regulators, community groups, and citizens
could more carefully monitor lender practices.

37

With the additional

27. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-09 (2005).
28. Id. § 290 1(b).
29. Donna S. Harkness, PredatoryLending Prevention Project: Prescribinga Curefor
the Home Equity Loss Ailing the Elderly, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 37 (Fall 2000).
30. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: History of HMDA, supra note 26.
31. Id.
32. 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a) (2005). These application statistics include the type of loan
application, the amount of the loan applied for, the application's purpose, the type and
location of the property for the loan application, and whether the application was a preapproval that was denied or originated. Id.
33. Id. at §§ 203.4(a).
34. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: History of HMDA, supra note 26.
35. See generally Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: History of HMDA, supra note 26
(detailing the increased disclosure requirements for lenders). By requiring many more
disclosure requirements, lenders are encouraged to use non-discriminatory criteria because
regulatory agencies can better determine discrimination with the additional requirements.
36. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: History of HMDA, supra note 26.
37. Id.
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demographic information, regulatory agencies could more easily "red
flag" lenders whose data showed disparities and could indicate that
further investigation was needed to determine if discriminatory
practices were present.38 As a result, regulatory agencies, fair housing
advocacy groups, and individual consumers grew stronger because they
39
could demand more accountability from their community lenders.
This accountability was strengthened even more in 2002,40 when
the Federal Reserve Board (the Board) proposed to expand the
41
information reported under HMDA to include pricing. The new
pricing requirements became effective on January 1, 2004 and lenders
were required to make their individual reports publicly available in
March 2005.42 Notwithstanding, the 2004 HMDA aggregate report,
containing loan pricing information, was not released until September
Council. 43
2005 by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
These new requirements pose a litany of new challenges and issues for
lenders.44 The way that lenders handle the content and reporting of

38. Ethan Zindler, In Focus: 200 Facing Scrutiny on HMDA Data, AM. BANKER
ONLINE, (Sept. 19, 2005), http://www.americanbanker.com/article_search.html?article
queryid=666208186&hitnum=7.
39. See generally Robert B. Avery, Glen B. Canner, & Robert E. Cook, New
Information Reported Under HMDA and Its Application in FairLending Enforcement 344
(2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2005/3-05hmda.pdf (inferring that the
increased power of regulatory agencies, fair housing advocacy groups, and consumers is
based on the premise that with more information reported under HMDA, these parties could
possibly scrutinize the practices of lenders more easily without having to try to gain this
additional data only through discovery).
40. Warren W. Traiger & Joseph Calluori, The Fair Lending Implications of the New
Home Mortgage DisclosureAct Data, 84 BANKING REP. (BNA) 347, 347 (Aug. 29, 2005).
The Federal Reserve Board first proposed that pricing information be reported under
HMDA in 2000. That proposal would have required lenders to report each loan's annual
percentage rate instead of the 2002 revision, which requires that lenders report the spread
between a loan's APR and the comparable Treasury yield. Id.
41. Id.
42. Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 64-65.
43. Avery, Canner, & Cook, supra note 39; see also Ethan Zindler, supra note 38.
44. Lenders fear that the public response to the 2004 HMDA data could lead to classaction lawsuits, increased federal regulation and damage to lenders' reputations. Use 8
Explanationsfor Higher-Cost Mortgage Loans to Avoid PR Crisis Over 2004 HAIDA
Report, MORTGAGE L. COMPLIANCE INSIDER, Sept. 2005, at 1.
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HMDA data could substantially affect their prosperity45 and ultimately
47
the availability of subprime 4 6 loans, based on risk, for consumers.
III.

THE

NEW REQUIREMENTS OF HMDA

The Board first proposed to amend HMDA to include the new
requirements in 2000 and published the proposed amendments for
public comments.4a Nearly 300 comments were received and most of
the commenting lenders, community groups, and civil rights groups
supported expanding the reporting requirement to previously excluded
non-traditional lenders.4 9 Support for the inclusion of pricing data,
however, was not met with the same enthusiasm. ° Community and
civil rights groups wanted the data to help enforce fair lending laws and
to provide more information regarding the mortgage markets.5'
Lenders, on the other hand, opposed the pricing requirement because
they believed that it would be burdensome and misinterpreted by the
public.52
The Board believed that the new requirements were necessary in
order to "improve understanding of the mortgage market, including the
subprime market, and assist in enforcing fair lending laws."53 The
Board also considered each proposed change in light of the aggregate
benefit and burden of all of the proposed changes.5 Consequently, the
Board adopted final amendments that were substantially similar to the

45. This notion of prosperity is based upon the assumption that if lenders are forced to
spend large amounts of time and money on litigation, public relations rebuilding, and
regulatory compliance, then their bottom lines will be negatively affected.
46. Joseph A. Smith, Jr., FinancialLiteracy, Regulation and Consumer Welfare, 8 N.C.
BANKING INST. 77, at 81 (2004). The distinction between prime and subprime lending has
been described as, "the 'prime' market, comprising borrowers deemed creditworthy under
traditional lending standards, and the 'subprime' market, which includes borrowers with no
credit history or damaged credit." Id.
47. This notion assumes that if lenders have to face costly litigation due to the HMDA
statistics that show higher loan prices for minorities, their subprime lending programs, are
likely to be the first cut.
48. 67 Fed. Reg. 7,222 (Feb. 15, 2002).
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.at 7,223.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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proposal."
HMDA now requires lenders to include six additional categories
56
of data that may flag discriminatory lending. The added requirements

provide regulators and community groups with more information to
7
determine whether lenders are engaging in discriminatory practices.

58
The new requirements require lenders to report the rate spread of a

loan if it is three or more percentage points for first-lien loans and five

59
or more percentage points for subordinate-lien loans. The rate spread
is the difference between the annual percentage rate on the loan and the
6°
yield on comparable U.S. Treasury securities.

Further, lenders are required to identify loans that are subject to
61
the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA). Passed in
1994 to combat predatory lending, HOEPA regulates loans that are
secured by the borrower's principal residence with annual percentage
rates above certain thresholds.62 Under HOEPA, lenders are required to

report a rate spread of eight percentage points for first-lien loans and ten
points for subordinate-lien loans, which is higher than the new
requirement under HMDA.63 "Obtaining HOEPA status on loans is
critical to address fair-lending concerns related to loan pricing and to
55. Id.
56. 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(12 -14) (2005); see also Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 64.
57. Traiger & Calluori, supra note 40, at 347.
58. Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 65.
59. 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(12) (2005).
60. Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 65. Reporting a differential between greater than
the specified percentage acts as a flag that regulators may use to examine the reason for the
greater disparity in a consumer's loan and comparable Treasury securities; see generally
Avery, Canner, & Cook, supra note 39.
61. 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(13) (2005).
HOEPA status is a new field that was added to the HMDA LAR
beginning January 1, 2004. There are two quality edits (Q044 and
Q045) that check whether specific loans reported on the 2004 HMDA
LAR[loan application register] are HOEPA loans. For example, it is
expected that the majority of: (a) originated home improvement loans or
refinancings that are secured by a first lien with a rate spread greater
than 8% or (b) originated home improvement loans or refinancings that
are secured by a subordinate lien with a rate spread greater than 10%
will be classified as HOEPA loans. Only a very small percentage of the
loans from (a) or (b) above would not actually be HOEPA loans.
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Memorandum, (Nov. 29, 2004),
http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/pdf/FFIECguidance2004.pdf.
http://www.stlouisfed.org/hmdaregc
C Amendments,
62. HMDA Regulation
amendments/pages/hoepastatus.html; see also Avery, Canner, & Cook, supra note 39.
63. HMDA Regulation C Amendments, supra note 62.
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better understand the mortgage market, including the subprime
market." 64 Finally, lenders are required to obtain a collection of
information on the applicant's race, ethnicity, and sex for all
applications completed in person, by mail, on the phone, or over the
internet. 65 The other new requirements continue to make discriminatory
lending practices more easily discernable.6 6
These changes in the reporting requirements of lenders reflect
the Board's concern with unfair lending.67 The new requirements
provide regulatory agencies with much greater insight into lender
practices than the previous requirements.68 The Board clearly stated this
position by noting that, "obtaining loan pricing data is critical to address
fair lending concerns related to loan pricing and to better understand the
mortgage market., 69 Consequently, with these revisions, the Board
made a significant step toward increasing awareness of discriminatory
loan practices as outlined in HMDA's purpose.70
IV.

WHAT THE

NEW HMDA

DATA REPORTS SHOW

Preliminary reports show that the additional requirements have
certainly made a difference in the kind of information that can be
64. Id.
65. 12 C.F.R.§ 203.4(14) (2005); see also Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 64.
66. 12 C.F.R.§ 203.4(14) (2005). The other requirements include reporting denials of
requests for preapprovals, reporting loans or applications that involve manufactured homes,
and characterizing loans using the act's definitions of "refinancing" and "home
improvement loan." These may be used to identify patterns of disparity between borrowers,
which may be a sign of discrimination. Id.
67. See generally 67 Fed. Reg. 7,222 (2005) (noting the agency's growing concern with
predatory lending).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: Background and Purpose, supra note 17.
This regulation implements the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, which
is intended to provide the public with loan data that can be used:
(i) To help determine whether financial institutions are serving the
housing
needs of their communities;
(ii) To assist public officials in distributing public-sector investment so
as to
attract private investment to areas where it is needed; and
(iii) To assist in identifying possible discriminatory lending patterns
and enforcing anti-discrimination statutes.

CONSUMER CREDIT
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7
Media outlets and antigathered about lending practices. "
discrimination community organizations eagerly anticipated the 2004
HMDA report.7 Many requested HMDA data from lending institutions
73
The
before the official release of the data by the government.
sharp
showed
preliminary data that some of these lenders provided
disparities between the loans received by minorities and white
borrowers.74 According to the Wall Street Journal,one major national
lender's pricing data showed that minorities were twice as likely as
white borrowers to have loans that fall within the new HMDA price
reporting criteria. 7' Further, the National Community Reinvestment
Coalition reported that 28.7% of African Americans and 15.4% of
Hispanic borrowers had higher-priced loans for first-lien home
purchases from leading national lenders as opposed to 7.8% of white
borrowers.76 Additionally, the 2004 report showed that 24.7% of
African Americans, 21.1% of Native Americans, and 18.4% of
Hispanics were denied conventional loans compared with only 10.1% of
white applicants.77
Following the release of the 2004 HMDA report, federal
regulators flagged 200 lenders, including 100 banks, for further
According to the
investigation regarding possible discrimination.
79 African American borrowers were two to three times
Board's analysis,
8
more likely than white borrowers to receive a higher-priced loan. "
81 For
Federal agencies have approached this data in different ways.
example, the Board promptly contacted approximately twenty-five
lenders to obtain further information, which could include borrowers'

71. Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 65; see also Nat'l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal.,
AND PRICING DISPARITIES IN THE MORTGAGE MARKETPLACE: A NCRC
(June 2005),
MONTH,
REPORT FOR NATIONAL HOMEOWNERSHIP
FOLLOW-UP
PREAPPROVALS

http://www.ncrc.org/pressandpubs/press-releases/documents/Preapproval-Report-June5.p
df.
72. Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 64.
73. See id.
74. Id.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Nat'l Cmty. Reinvestment Coal., supra note 71, at 5.
Avery, Canner, & Cook, supra note 39, at 374.
Zindler, supra note 38.
Avery, Canner, & Cook, supra note 39, at 377.
Zindler, supra note 38.

81. Id.
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credit scores.8 2 Similarly, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) 83 is concerned about the report and is considering
a full-scale investigation, but has not yet requested further information
from lenders.84 Regulators will likely seek explanations from the
lenders regarding the reasons for the disparities, as well as, possibly
seeking to obtain credit scores, debt-to-income ratios, and other factors
needed to do their own analyses.8 5
Although, the report shows disparities between minority
borrowers and white borrowers, the HMDA data alone is insufficient to
prove lending discrimination. 86 There are several other factors 87 that
play a significant role in loan pricing decisions, such as credit score,
loan-to-value ratio, and debt-to-income ratio. 88 "The HMDA data are
not, by themselves, a basis for definitive conclusions regarding whether
a lender discriminates unlawfully against particular borrowers or takes
unfair advantage of them. 89 Still, lenders should expect thorough
examinations and potential litigation from regulators, community
organizations, and consumers because of the disparity in pricing
between minority and white borrowers. 90

82. Id.
83. Id (monitoring of non-bank lenders and enforcement of the federal Fair Housing
Act).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
87. Marcia J. Courhcane,
Understanding Underwriting Factors, (2005),
http://www.chase.com/cm/chf/miscellaneous/file/document/Courchane.ppt.
Such factors
include credit scores, debt-to-income ratio, and loan-to-value ratios. Id.
88. Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 64.
89. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Department of Housing and
Urban Development, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, National Credit Union
Administration, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of Thrift Supervision,
Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About the New HMDA Data (Mar. 31, 2005),
http://www.occ.treas.gov/toolkit/newsrelease.aspx?JNR=I &Doc=IZLQRDB.xml.
90. Zindler, supra note 38.
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V. THE ROLE OF HMDA DATA IN ESTABLISHING LOAN DISCRIMINATION
A.

Types of Loan Discrimination

91
Two federal laws, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)
9 2 govern credit and loan
and the Fair Housing Act (FHA),
discrimination. 93 Three types of discrimination are recognized under the
ECOA and the FHA. 94 The first is overt discrimination, where a lender
95
Next is disparate
"blatantly discriminates on a prohibited basis."
treatment, which occurs "when a lender treats applicants differently
96 Finally, there is disparate
based on one of the prohibited factors."
impact, which occurs "when a lender applies a practice uniformly to all
applicants but the practice has a discriminatory effect on a prohibited
97
basis and is not justified by business necessity.
Claims under the ECOA and FHA may be brought by an
individual or by a class, and the HMDA data will largely be used to
support claims against lenders based on the latter two forms of
98
Fair
discrimination - disparate treatment and disparate impact.
housing community groups and class action attorneys know that HMDA
data alone cannot be used to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under the ECOA and FHA, but the new pricing data
requirements can strengthen their claims of disparate treatment and
impact. 99 Especially in proving disparate treatment, a plaintiff needs to
have access to non-public data from the lender that is not included
under HMDA.'0° Most of the time, a plaintiff will not have access to

91. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (2005). "The ECOA forbids discrimination based on an
applicant's race, color, national origin, gender, religion, age, marital status, or receipt of
public assistance income or because the applicant has exercised rights under certain
consumer protection laws. The FHA forbids discrimination based on race, color, gender,
age, religion, handicap or familial status." Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Risk-focused
Fair Lending, COMMUNITY DIVIDEND 1999 Issue 3 (1999), http://minneapolisfed.org
/pubs/cd/99-3/fairlending.cfm.
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (2005).
93. Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 66.
Acts - Statements of Policy, (Apr. 15, 1994)
94. FDIC, FDICLaw, Regulations, Related
0 0 3 86
0.html.
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/50 95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 63 and 66.
99. Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 66.
100. Cf Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Fed. Reserve
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this type of information.' 0 1 Even with this information, however, there
are many other variables that go into a lender's pricing decision.
Because of the challenge presented by obtaining necessary non-public
information from the lender, 102 sustaining a claim based on a disparate
treatment theory is difficult. 10 3 A plaintiff must show that he or she

was, as an individual, treated differently than other applicants under a
lender's neutral policy.'0 4 To do this, a plaintiff would need to find

other applicants with similar credit scores, debt-to-income ratios,
purchasing similar properties, with similar down-payments, and other
factors in order to establish that holding these factors equal, the plaintiff
received different treatment.105 For these reasons, this information is
difficult to obtain, thereby making a disparate treatment claim difficult
06

to substantiate.1

Bd., Office of Thrift Supervision, and Nat'l Credit Union Admin. [hereinafter OCC et al.],
Interagency Fair Lending Examination Procedures, Page iii. (2005) (inferring the
requirement that disparate treatment claims be based on either overt or comparable evidence
which is not included in HMDA reports and would thereby need to be obtained in other
ways).
101. OCC et al., supra note 100, at 7-8. According to federal regulatory agencies, some
examples of non-public data that examiners use to find disparate treatment are: "loan officer
or broker compensation relationships," broad discretion in pricing/transaction costs", "use of
risk-based pricing that is not empirically or statistically sound," "high percentages of either
exceptions to underwriting criteria or overrides of credit score cutoffs," "and lack of clear,
objective standards for classifying applicants... as 'prime' or 'subprime' borrowers." Id.
Since this data is not available to the public, plaintiffs will have to rely on other methods of
finding such proprietary information and/or discovery devices. Id
102. See id.
103. Latimore v. Citibank, 979 F.Supp. 662, 665 (N.D.I11. 1997) (applying the prima
facie requirements for disparate treatment). In order to demonstrate a primafacie case of
disparate treatment, plaintiffs must prove: "(1) they are members of a protected class; (2)
they applied and were qualified for a loan; (3) they were rejected for the loan; and (4)
defendants continued to approve loans for other applicants with similar qualifications." Id.
Proving disparate impact slightly lessens the role that such internal documents play because
the focus is on the "disproportionate adverse impact" that a lender's policies have on a
protected class.
Fairlending, Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, (2005),
http://minneapolisfed.org/pubs/cd/99-3/fairlending.cfm.
104. OCC et al., supra note 100.
105. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 100-05 and accompanying text. This inference is drawn from the
requirement that disparate treatment claims be based on either overt or comparable evidence
which is not included in HMDA reports and would thereby need to be obtained in other
ways. Id.
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Using HMDA to EstablishDisparateImpact

B.

In light of the new HMDA data, plaintiffs will be more likely to
1 7
use it to support a claim of disparate impact. " The number of affected
persons makes disparate impact claims more conducive to class action
8
lawsuits, but recent legislation' makes it easier for lenders to remove
state-brought class action suits to less "plaintiff-oriented" federal
courts.' 0 9 Disparate impact occurs "when a lender applies a racially or
otherwise neutral policy or practice equally to all credit applicants, but
the policy or practice disproportionately excludes or burdens certain
1 0 The regulatory agencies.1 explain
persons on a prohibited basis."
that, "although the precise contours of the law on disparate impact as it
applies to lending discrimination are under development, it has been
clearly established [that] the single fact that a policy or practice ' creates
proof of a violation." 12
a disparity on a prohibited basis is not alone
Evidence of discriminatory intent is not necessary to establish
that a lender's policy violates the ECOA or FHA on grounds of
disparate impact." 3 In order for a plaintiff to prove that a lender has
violated the ECOA or FHA on grounds of disparate impact, the plaintiff
must prove: (1) that the lender's policy or practice has a disparate
impact on a protected class, (2) that the disparate impact created by the
'4
lender's policy is unjustified by an adequate "business necessity,"" and
(3) that an alternative policy could serve the same purpose with less
discriminatory effect." 5
As part of establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact, a
plaintiff must use statistical evidence to show that the lender's policy

107. Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 66.

courts
108. Id. at 67 and 68. The Class Action Fairness Act greatly expands federal
for lenders
ability to exercise jurisdiction over class action lawsuits, thereby making it easier
to remove a case to federal courts. Id.
109. Id.
110. OCC et al., supra note 100, at iv.
11. Id. The agencies mentioned are the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Thrift
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve Board, Office of
Id.
Supervision, and National Credit Union Administration.
112. Id.
113.

Id.

cost
114. Id. This necessity must not be hypothetical or speculative, and may include

and/or profitability. Id.
115. OCC et al., supranote 100, at iv.
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has a significantly greater adverse effect on a protected class. 11 6 Once
proven, some circuits then shift the burden of proof to the lender to
demonstrate a valid business necessity. 1 7
Other circuits have
established four criteria for evaluating a claim based on a policy's
disparate impact: (1) strength of the plaintiffs' statistical showing; (2)
the lender's legitimate interest in the action; (3) some indication of
discriminatory intent; and (4) possible relief obtained if another practice
would be used." 8
C.

Examining the Role ofHMDA in DisparateImpact Litigation

HMDA data can play a significant role in the success or failure
of a plaintiffs claim of loan discrimination based upon a theory of
disparate impact. 1 9 That role can be better understood by closely
examining two significant loan discrimination cases. The courts in both
Thomas v. First Federal Savings Bank of Indiana120 and Hargraves v.
Capital City Mortgage Corp.121 placed heavy weight on the plaintiffs'
use of HMDA data in establishing their claim. 22
In Thomas, African American homeowners brought an action
against First Federal Savings Bank of Indiana after the lender refused to
grant them a second mortgage on their home. 123 As one of their claims,
the plaintiffs argued discrimination under disparate impact theory. 24
The district court applied the four-tiered evaluation method of
determining disparate impact and held that the lender did not violate the

116. Simms v. Gibraltar Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (1996).
117. Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988);
see also The Chicago Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc., The Mortgage
and Insurance Discrimination Manual, http://www.clccrul.org/MORT&INS.htm (last
visited Jan 10, 2006); see also Thomas P. Vartania, Robert H. Ledig, & Alisa Babitz,
Disparate Impact Discrimination:Fair Lending at a Crossroads, 2 1ST ARTICLES BY 2 1ST
CENTURY MONEY, BANKING AND COMMERCE ALERT AND BANCMAIL
AUTHORS, (2005),
http://www.ffhsj.com/bancmai/bmarts/cfqr.htm.
118. Metro. Hous. Devel. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1977); see
also Thomas v. First Fed. Say. Bank of Ind., 653 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
119. See generally Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C.
2000).
120. Thomas, 653 F. Supp. at 1330.
121. Hargraves,140 F. Supp. 2d at 7.
122. See generally Thomas, 653 F. Supp. 1330; Hargraves, 140 F. Supp. 2d 7.
123. Thomas, 653 F. Supp. at 1330.
124. Id.
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FHA or the ECOA.
The plaintiffs in Thomas provided HMDA data as evidence of
the alleged disparate impact, but the court held that, as a matter of law,
126
the statistical evidence alone was not enough to prove the violation.
The HMDA data showed the number and amounts of the loans issued
by First Federal by type and community over a two-year period, but
nothing more. 127 The plaintiffs did not provide any further analysis of
the HMDA data, nor did they attempt to explain to the court what the
data showed. 128 The court called the statistical evidence "incomplete
and disjointed"'' 29 and stated that:
Plaintiffs' attorneys offered no explanation of the
meaning of these figures, they made no attempt to
present evidence which would allow the court to draw
any inferences from them. This evidence, standing
alone, does not establish that race played any part in
First Federal's decisions to make loans to people in
inferences can be drawn in that
Gary; no 3reasonable
0
direction.
The court went further to say that there are numerous legitimate
business factors that go into a loan decision which do not qualify as a
3
violation.' '
There is nothing in the Board's regulations or in the
Board's policies which mandates an association to make
a bad loan as long as the criteria they use for making the
loan are legitimate business criteria, such as the credit
worthiness of the borrower, the marketability, the
salability of the security property, including the
neighborhood in which it's located which has a bearing
125. Id. at 1340.
126. Id.
127. Id.

128. Id.
129. Thomas, 653 F. Supp. at 1341.
130. Thomas, 653 F. Supp. at 1340.
131. Id.
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on the salability, the diversification of the institution's
32
assets. All these things are legitimate criteria.
Conversely, in Hargraves, the court found that the plaintiffs
made a prima facie case for disparate impact.133 The eight plaintiffs in
Hargraves alleged that the lender practiced reverse red-lining 134 by
targeting African-American communities for "predatory" loan products,
which had a disparate impact on those communities.1 35 The plaintiffs
used HMDA data to show that Capital City made a greater percentage
of its loans than other subprime lenders in census tracts where African
Americans were a majority. 136 The plaintiffs used the HMDA data to
support a specific claim of disparate impact. 37 In addition, the data
showed that Capital City made a disproportionately large number of
loans in neighborhoods which were over ninety percent black, showing
that Capital City's business was heavily targeted toward African
Americans. 138 The plaintiffs expanded upon the HMDA data by
providing additional evidence that supported the HMDA conclusions,
including evidence of the lender's solicitation of mortgage brokers who
worked in predominately black communities, the decision to open
offices within black communities, and of the display of pictures of the
company president with black leaders including Rev. Jesse Jackson and
Marion Berry.13 9
Unlike the plaintiffs in Thomas, the plaintiffs in Hargraves
made a compelling argument using HMDA data. 40 In other words, they
did not just let the numbers speak for themselves. 14' Instead, they

132. Id.
133. Hargraves v. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp.2d at 21.
134. Id. Reverse red-lining occurs when lenders specifically target groups or
neighborhoods for unfair, sub-prime lending products. Id. at 20.
135. Id. at 18-21.
136. Id. at 21-22.
137. Id.

138. Hargravesv. Capital City Mortgage Corp., 140 F. Supp.2d at 21-22.
139. Id.
140. Compare Hargraves, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 21-22 (holding that the plaintiffs used
HMDA data to support their argument for disparate impact), with Thomas v. First Fed. Sav.
Bank of Indiana, 653 F. Supp. 1330, 1335-36, 1340 (N.D.Ind. 1987) (holding that the
plaintiffs use of the HMDA data was "incomplete" and did not support their claim for
disparate impact).
141. See Hargraves, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 21-22.

2006]
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14 2
informed the court of the inference that they were trying to make.
They took an already strong use of the statistical data and added other
evidence to make it stronger.143 In fact, the HMDA data coupled with
the plaintiffs supporting evidence convinced the court that a prima
In contrast, the
facie case for disparate impact had been made. 1"
Thomas plaintiffs' lack of specificity in and support of their HMDA
145
data led to their claim's dismissal.
Both cases contain valuable lessons. 46 HMDA data can be a
very effective tool for both the plaintiff and the lender. 147 Plaintiffs will
want to follow the Hargraves example and provide strong, relevant
claims. 48
statistical data coupled with other evidence to support their
The effect of the HMDA reports has the potential to be far more
prejudicial to lenders since the revision. "49 Lenders should emphasize
HMDA's limitations, even after the expanded revisions. 150 There are a
myriad of other factors that go into a loan decision and the courts should
be aware of them.' 5' Credit score, loan-to-value, and debt-to-income
ratio all play a huge role in the lending decision and may support higher
52
loan rates for borrowers based on the credit risk that they present. 153
Unfortunately, the HMDA data does not collect this information.
Accordingly, lenders should not let the courts be biased by the statistical
information suggesting disparate lending practices toward racial
groups. 54 Courts should be reminded that the HMDA data, standing

142. See id.
143. See id.
144. Id.

145. See Thomas, 653 F. Supp. at 1335-36, 1340.
146. See infra notes 147-56 and accompanying text.
147. See generally Thomas, 653 F. Supp. at 1335-36, 1340; Hargraves, 140 F. Supp. 2d
at 21-22 (showing both how effective use of HMDA data can support a plaintiffs case and
how ineffective use of HMDA data can support a lender's defense).
148. See Hargraves,140 F. Supp. 2d at 21-22.
149. Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 63, 65. Based on preliminary data showing that
minorities, on average receive higher loans than white borrowers, the immediate perception
of the media, community groups, and regulatory agencies is that lenders are engaged in
discriminatory activities. Id.
150. Id. at 65.
151. See, e.g., Thomas, 653 F. Supp. at 1340 (acknowledging that "there are numerous
legitimate business factors that go into a decision to make a loan which do not form the
basis of a violation under [the ECOA or the FHA].").
152. See id.; Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 65.
153. Few, supra note 18.
154. Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 67.
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alone, does not establish impermissible discrimination. 15 5 Lenders
should follow the traditional defense approach to assert (1) no cause of
action for disparate impact exists, (2) plaintiffs have failed to establish a
prima facie disparate impact case because of the weakness of their
statistical data, and (3) even if prima facie case is made, there is a
56
legitimate business justification for the challenged policy or practice.
VI. PROACTIVE STEPS FOR MOVING FORWARD

The most important thing for lenders to remember when facing
the possible negative press, damage to reputation, and litigation is to be
proactive.' 57 First, lenders should analyze their own HMDA data in
order to know exactly what it shows and does not show.' 58 The second
task is to conduct a thorough S.W.O.T. analysis regarding the HMDA
data. 59 Finally, lenders should develop an explanation of their HMDA
data that can be shared with the public. 160 These items should be done
as soon as possible so that lenders will not be caught off-guard by
regulatory agencies, community groups, and litigants who may know
161
what the data shows better than they do.
First, the importance of a lender conducting a thorough,
independent analysis of HMDA data cannot be stressed strongly
enough. 62 Doing so allows the lender to be ready for any questions that
regulators, potential litigants, or the media may have, thus preventing
any surprises. 163 There are numerous software programs that enable
lenders to review HMDA data and non-HMDA data in a myriad of
ways.' 64 Regulators will pay particular attention to the higher-priced
loans made to protected class borrowers and their average rate
spreads. 65 Lenders should compare their data to that of their peers in
each of the geographic areas where their company does significant
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 70.
Few, supra note 18.
See infra notes 170-87.
Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 70.

161. Few, supra note 18 (noting that "now" is the time for lenders to act).
162.
163.
164.
165.

See id.; Traiger & Calluori, supra note 40, at 351.
Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 70.
Few, supra note 18.
Traiger & Calluori supra note 40, at 351.
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it
business.1 66 If the lender finds some disparity in its loan pricing, 167
disparity.
this
for
reason
the
finds
should investigate further until it
Assuming that a legitimate business reason cannot be found, the lender
should immediately take steps to reform its lending practices. 68 The
bottom line is that lending is a risk-assessment industry, and lenders can
data only if they know exactly
minimize risk regarding their HMDA
169
it.
for
what it shows and prepare
After lenders conduct an analysis of their HMDA data, they
should prepare a S.W.O.T. analysis. 7 ' Business planners, marketing
firms, and public relations professionals have long advocated the use of
S.W.O.T. analyses to properly prepare for expansion, new
opportunities, or potential business problems.' 71 Lenders should do the
same. In a S.W.O.T. analysis, a company examines its strengths,
72
weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in order to plan accordingly.
Lenders should ask what their strengths are in this situation.'73 The
lender should ask whether the data shows little or no disparity across
protected classes. 174 Additionally, the lender should inquire if the data

shows that minorities receive lower loan pricing than their peers.' 75
These all may be strengths that can be highlighted. 76 Then, the lender
should look at its weaknesses. 177 Perhaps there are some statistics that

166. Id.
167. Id.

168. Id.
169. See Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 70.
170. Net MBA Bus. Knowledge Ctr., SWOT Analysis, http://www.netmba.com/strategy

/swot/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2006).
SWOT analysis is a simple framework for generating strategic
alternatives from a situation analysis. It is applicable to either the
corporate level or the business unit level and frequently appears in
SWOT stands for Strengths, Weaknesses,
marketing plans.
Opportunities, and Threats. The SWOT framework was described in the
late 1960s by Kenneth Andrews, C. Roland Christiansen, William D.
Guth, & Edmund P. Learned.

Id.
171. See id.
172. Seeid.
173. Seeid.

174. Traiger & Calluori, supra note 40, at 351.
175. Id. (explaining that a thorough analysis should be completed to see exactly what the

lender's data shows).
176. See Traiger & Calluori, supra note 40, at 351.
177. See Net MBA Bus. Knowledge Ctr., supra note 170.
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the public could misinterpret as discrimination.17 8 Perhaps there are
other weaknesses that the data may show such as higher loan prices than
competitors.
The lender should be ready for these possible
misinterpretations. 7 9 A detailed explanation should be prepared in
advance to respond to and explain inquiries regarding the lender's
data. 8 ° Next, lenders should examine opportunities that are present
during this tumultuous time. 18 1 Often a lender can tout some of its
strengths to combat the negative publicity that the lending industry will
face. 182 For example, it may be time for a campaign that highlights the
lender's proud statistics of fairness and equality in lending or that the
large number of loans that it provides for credit-challenged lenders.
"[The HMDA data] may also open new opportunities if... there are
substantial numbers of protected class borrowers who are sufficiently
credit-worthy to qualify for prime mortgages.' ' 183 Taking advantage of
1 84
this market may provide great rewards for those who respond quickly.
Finally, lenders should make an honest assessment of the threats posed
by the data report.' 85 Maybe analysis shows that there is some
unexplained disparate treatment, or that a competitor's data shows nondisparity across-the board. For whatever is determined to be a threat,
the lender needs a plan to deal with it.' 86 Creating a S.W.O.T. analysis
will help lenders be proactive and plan their way through a potentially
87
difficult time. 1
Finally, a lender should prepare an explanation of its HMDA
data that it can easily share with the public. 188 Lenders should reassure
consumers that they have nothing to hide and that they handle their
business with the utmost integrity, 8 9 while, at the same time, being
178. Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 70.
179. See generally Use 8 Explanations for Higher-Cost Mortgage Loans to Avoid PR

Crisis Over 2004 HMDA Report, supra note
misinterpretations of a lender's HMDA data).

44

(outlining

explanations

180. Id.
181. See Net MBA Bus. Knowledge Ctr., supra note 170.

182. See Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 63; Traiger & Calluori, supra note 40, at 352.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Traiger & Calluori, supra note 40, at 352.
Id.
See Net MBA Bus. Knowledge Ctr., supra note 170.
Id.

187. See supra notes 170-186 and accompanying text.
188. Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 70.
189. See id.

for
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mindful not to include any proprietary information.'9" The different
factors that play a part in the loan pricing decision should be explained
so that the public doesn't just look at statistics and think that
discrimination is occurring.' 9' Lenders may want to issue press releases
with their data explanations if they are positive. The media will
probably have plenty of seemingly negative stories to report, if the
preliminary reports are any indication. 92 Any positive exposure that
lenders can get during this time will be an asset.1 93 Most importantly,
lenders do not want to be caught off-guard by inquiries that regulators,
the media, or customers may have. 194 By being proactive and having
statements prepared and ready, lenders can show that they have nothing
to hide.' 95
VII. CONCLUSION
The release of the revised HMDA data will certainly cause a stir
in the lending community. 9 6 Lenders should thoroughly prepare
themselves for the possible regulatory, media and community group
inquiries and litigation.' 97 Judging from the preliminary inquiries and
the initial reaction to the release of the 2004 report, there will be
significant fallout and the best way for lenders to prepare is to be
99
proactive.19 Plans should be made to meet the turmoil head-on.'
Lenders should conduct analysis of their own data and be prepared to
explain it to an inquisitive public.200 Lenders should also familiarize
themselves with the revisions made to HMDA and look at prior loan
discrimination cases to be ready for any litigation that may result from
the data's release. 20 '
190. Use 8 Explanationsfor Higher-CostMortgage Loans to Avoid PR Crisis Over 2004
HMDA Report, supra note 44.

191. Id.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Id.; see also Few, supra note 18.
See Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 70.
Id.
See id.

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Traiger & Calluori, supra note 40, at 352; Few, supra note 18.
Id.
Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 70.
See supra notes 157-95 and accompanying text.
Klubes & Saul, supra note 7, at 70.
Id.
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In addition, lenders should thoroughly examine and analyze
their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in regard to the
release of the revised HMDA data.2 °2 By completing a S.W.O.T.
analysis, lenders will be more adequately prepared to handle any
problems that may occur and take advantage of any opportunities that
arise from the 2004 reports. °3 Completing a S.W.O.T. analysis, after
analyzing their own HMDA data, forces lenders to be proactive and to
think about how the data can and will affect their institution in the
future.2 °4 This proactivity is essential for lenders to survive the possible
bad public relations, litigation, and regulatory controls that may follow
the release of the 2004 HMDA data.20 5
HENRY M. JAY

202.
203.
204.
205.

See supranotes
See supra notes
See supra notes
See supra notes

170-87
170-87
170-87
157-95

and accompanying
and accompanying
and accompanying
and accompanying

text.
text.
text.
text.

